In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system on his own. In this note we relax this assumption and provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria for this game under the assumption that the system as a whole is stabilizable.
Introduction
In this note we reconsider the linear quadratic differential game to minimize lim T →∞ J i (x 0 , u 1 , u 2 , T )
where
subject to the dynamic state equatioṅ
Here x(t) ∈ IR n , u i ∈ IR m i , matrix R i is positive definite and Q i are symmetric, i = 1, 2. We assume that the players have an open-loop information structure about the game. That is, at time t = t 0 they have all information about the game, determine their actions, which are then enforced as binding agreements for the whole planning horizon. Moreover, we assume that players will play a Nash strategy, i.e., they look for actions that have the property that a unilateral deviation from these actions makes them worse off. This problem has been considered by many authors in the past (see e.g. [2] for references). This problem has been solved under the assumption that every player is capable to stabilize the system by his own, i.e. the pairs (A, B i ), i = 1, 2, are stabilizable. In this note we will relax this assumption. We will provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria for this game under the assumption that the matrix pair (A, [B 1 B 2 ]) is stabilizable.
Assuming that the set of control functions considered by the players consists of the following set To that purpose we first introduce some notation. Throughout we will use 0 to denote a zero matrix that has dimensions that follow from the context where it is used (in particular, in some cases, it may happen that in fact it does not appear (i.e. it reduces to the empty matrix)). Let T i be nonsingular transformation matrices which transform (A, B i ) into its controllable canonical form, i = 1, 2, (see Lemma 3.1, with n i the dimension of the controllability subspace). Let
Theorem 1.1 Consider the linear quadratic differential game (1, 2) . Assume that (A,
If the linear quadratic differential game (1, 2) has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial state, then
1. M has at least n stable eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities). More in particular, there exists a p-dimensional stable M-invariant subspace S, with p ≥ n, such that
, the two algebraic Riccati equations,
have a symmetric solution
Conversely, if the two algebraic Riccati equations (4) have a stabilizing solution and v T (t) =:
then,
provides an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic differential game (1, 2) .
Notice that the matricesS i andQ i that appear in M are, in general, not symmetric and the dimensions of matrices A i may differ. This is a clear distinction with the standard case considered in literature (see e.g. [2] ). Now, letÃ
Consider the set of (coupled) algebraic Riccati equations Similar to, e.g., [2] it can be shown that the next relationship between certain invariant subspaces of matrix M and solutions of the Riccati equation (6) applies. This property can be used to calculate the (left-right) stabilizing solutions of (6). Lemma 1.3 Let V ⊂ IR n+n 1 +n 2 be an n-dimensional invariant subspace of M, and let X i ∈ IR n i ×n , i = 0, 1, 2, (with n 0 = n) be three real matrices such that
If X 0 is invertible, then P i := X i X −1 0 , i = 1, 2, solves (6) and σ(A −SP )) = σ(M| V ). Furthermore, (P 1 , P 2 ) is independent of the specific choice of basis of V .
such a solution is called strongly stabilizing. Lemma 1.4
1. The set of algebraic Riccati equations (6) has a LRS solution P T = [P T 1 P T 2 ] if and only if matrix M has an n-dimensional stable graph subspace and M has n 1 + n 2 eigenvalues (counting algebraic multiplicities) in l C + 0 .
2. If the set of algebraic Riccati equations (6) has a LRS solution, then it is unique.
Proof.
1. Assume that (6) has a LRS solution P . Then with T := I n 0 −P I n 1 +n 2 ,
Since P is a LRS solution, by Definition 1.2, matrix M has exact n stable eigenvalues and n 1 + n 2 eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities) in l C + 0 . Furthermore, obviously, the stable subspace is a graph subspace.
The converse statement is obtained similarly using the result of Lemma Similar to [2] it can be shown that the next two important corollaries hold. Corollary 1.5 The infinite-planning horizon two-player linear quadratic differential game (1,2) has for every initial state an open-loop Nash set of equilibrium actions (u * 1 , u * 2 ) which permit a feedback synthesis if and only if 1. there exist P 1 and P 2 that are solutions of the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (6) satisfying the additional constraint that the eigenvalues of A cl := A − S 1 P 1 − S 2 P 2 are all situated in the left half complex plane, and 2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (4) have a symmetric solution
If (P 1 , P 2 ) is a set of stabilizing solutions of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations (6), the actions
where Φ(t, 0) satisfies the transition equationΦ(t, 0) = A cl Φ(t, 0); Φ(0, 0) = I, yield an open-loop Nash equilibrium. The costs, by using these actions, for the players are
where M i is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation 
See, e.g., [1] for more details on this issue. 4. The results can be straightforwardly generalized for the N-player case. All results concerning matrix M should then be substituted by
In the next section we will illustrate this in a 3-player game.
Example
Consider the problem to find the open-loop Nash equilibria for the next three player game. The game might be interpreted as a debt stabilization problem within a two country setting which engaged in a monetary union. Within that setting the variables x i (t) can be interpreted as the government debt, scaled to the level of national output, of country i. u i as the primary fiscal deficit, also scaled to output, whereas the monetary financing undertaken by the central bank, measured as a fraction of aggregate output, is denoted by u E . All parameters are assumed to be positive. The welfare loss-function of country i, i = 1, 2, and central bank, respectively, is given by
The evolution of debt in both countries over time is assumed to be described by the differential equations
Let
Obviously, the pairs (A, B i ), i = 1, 2 are not stabilizable. Consequently we cannot directly use the standard theory on linear quadratic differential games to find the open-loop Nash equilibria (see e.g.
[2]). However, notice that the pair (A, B) is stabilizable. With T 1 = I, T 2 = 0 1 1 0 , T E = I, n 1 = n 2 = 1 and n E = 2 in Theorem 1.1 we have that matrix M equals
By straightforward calculating one can verify that the determinant of M − λI equals
So, independent of the sign of ρ 2 , this sixth order polynomial has 2 sign changes (if one orders it by descending variable exponent). So according Descartes' rule of signs matrix M has either two or no positive real roots. Furthermore, with λ replaced by −λ the corresponding polynomial has 4 sign changes. By Descartes' rule M therefore has either 4, 2 or no negative real roots. So, in case det has six real roots, 2 of them will be positive and 4 of them negative. So, generically, in that case the game will have an infinite number of open-loop Nash equilibria and 4 2 equilibria for which the corresponding equilibrium strategies permit a feedback synthesis. This is confirmed in case we chose, e.g., x 1 (0) = 0.7, x 2 (0) = 1.5, α 1 = 0.03, α 2 = 0.08, γ 1 = 1, γ 2 = 0.5, β 1 = 0.04, β 2 = 0.08, β E = 0.04 and ω = 0.3. In that case matrix M has the eigenvalues {0.7002, 0.2426, −0.0421, −0.0594, −0.2522, −0.6992}, and it is easily verified that there are 6 different strategies that permit a feedback synthesis. By including a discount factor into the cost the number of equilibria reduces. In this example it turns out that if the discount factor is larger than 12% there will be a unique equilibrium. We calculated the resulting equilibrium strategies if a discount factor of 14% is used. Then, P 1 = [0.1028 − 0.0951], 
In this specific case we observe that the central bank responds approximately with a three times higher monetary policy as the corresponding fiscal authorities to stabilize debt in their country. Furthermore we see that fiscal authorities negatively respond on a debt that has occurred in the other country. We plotted both the evolution of debt and control instruments in Figure 1 . From this figure we see that the initially strong monetary policy pursued by the central bank implies that the country with the initially smallest debt runs into a surplus. Furthermore, after five years the expansionary monetary financing policy of the central bank is replaced by a small contracting monetary financing.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we reconsidered the infinite planning horizon open-loop linear quadratic differential game. We derived under less stringent conditions than in current literature both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Based on the controllable canonical form of the system we showed along the lines of the proof of [2] that one can derive Nash equilibria for stabilizable systems similar to the standard case considered in literature. By determining for each individual player its controllable canonical form, one can derive matrix M that has a similar structure as in the standard case. Since the size of this square matrix is usually smaller than 3n it may be advantageous from a computational point of view, also in the standard case, to use this reduced form to calculate the Nash equilibria. We illustrated the theory in a small example.
trollability subspace has dimension n 1 ). Let v i , i = 1, · · · , n 1 be n 1 linearly independent columns of C and v n 1 +1 , · · · , v n be such that V := [v 1 · · · v n ] is invertible. Then, with T := V −1 ,x(t) = T x(t) satisfiesẋ(t) =Āx(t) +Bu(t), and (Ā,B) have the next properties:
whereĀ 11 ∈ IR n 1 ×n 1 ,B 1 ∈ IR n 1 ×m and (Ā 11 ,B 1 ) is controllable.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 "⇒ part" Suppose that u * 1 , u * 2 are a Nash solution. That is,
From the first inequality we see that for every x 0 ∈ IR n the (nonhomogeneous) linear quadratic control problem to minimize
subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equatioṅ
has a solution. Notice that by assumption x(t) → 0. So, since this problem has a minimum and R 1 > 0 it follows that u 1 (t) → 0 too. From Lemma 3.1 we have that there exists then a state-space transformationx(t) = T 1 x(t) such that the above minimization problem can be rewritten as the (nonhomogeneous) linear quadratic control problem to minimize
subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equation
where (A 1 ,B 1 ) is controllable and
By assumption this minimization problem has a solution for every initial state. This implies, see [3, Theorem A.1] , that the algebraic Riccati equation
has a stabilizing solution K 1 . Moreover the unique minimum is attained by
Herem 1 (t) is given bỹ
By straightforward differentiation of (17) we obtaiṅ
Next, introduce
Using (18) we geṫ
In a similar way it follows that there exists a state transformationx(t) = T 2 x(t) such that the minimization of J 2 can be rewritten as
Herem 1 (t) is given bŷ
where K 2 is the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
Introducing
we obtain then similarly as above thatψ
Since by assumption, for arbitrary x 0 , v 1 (t) converges to zero it follows from e.g. [2, Lemma 7 .36] that matrix M must have at least n stable eigenvalues (counting algebraic multiplicities). Moreover, the other statement follows from the second part of this lemma. Which completes this part of the proof. "⇐ part" Let u * 2 be as claimed in the theorem, that is
We next show that then necessarily u * 1 solves the optimization problem
Using the state transformationx = T 1x and notation of the proof of the first part of this theorem the above problem can then be rewritten as the minimization of (14) subject to the system (15). Since, by assumption, the algebraic Riccati equation (4) has a stabilizing solution, according [2, Theorem 5.16], the above minimization problem has a solution. This solution has the same structure as the solution advertised in (16,17). The only difference is that u * 2 (t) satisfies in this case (24). For that reason we will use the notation m 1 (t) instead ofm 1 (t) in (16,17). Introducing ψ 1 (t) := K 1x (t) + m 1 (t), we have that u 1 (t) = −R −1
1B
T 1ψ 1 and similar to (20) we get thaṫ
Consequently, x d (t) := T 1 x(t) −x(t) and ψ d (t) := ψ 1 (t) −ψ 1 (t) satisfẏ
, respectively. Or, stated differently,
x d (0) ψ d (0) = 0 p , for some p ∈ IR n 1 .
Notice that matrix
is the Hamiltonian matrix associated with the algebraic Riccati equation (4) . Recall that the spectrum of this matrix is symmetric w.r.t. the imaginary axis. Since by assumption the Riccati equation (4) has a stabilizing solution, we know that its stable invariant subspace is given by Span[I K 1 ] T . Therefore, with E u representing a basis for the unstable subspace, we can write
for some vectors v i , i = 1, 2. However, it is easily verified that due to our asymptotic stability assumption both x d (t) and ψ d (t) converge to zero if t → ∞. So, v 2 must be zero. From this it follows now directly that p = 0. Since the solution of the differential equation is uniquely determined, and [x d (t) ψ d (t)] = [0 0] solve it, we conclude thatx(t) = T 1 x(t) andψ 1 (t) = ψ 1 (t). Or stated differently, u * 1 solves the minimization problem. In a similar way it is shown that for u 1 given by u * 1 , player two his optimal control is given by u * 2 . Which proves the claim.
.
